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The Fugitive Dismissal Rule:
Ortega-Rodriguz Takes the Bite
Out of Flight
I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1993 movie "The Fugitive,"' Dr. Richard Kimble faces a convic-
tion in connection with the murder of his wife. Rather than experience
a lifetime of imprisonment, Kimble chooses to live as a fugitive. Under
the current Fugitive Dismissal Rule,' if Kimble returned to the jurisdic-
tion, his right to appeal his conviction would depend solely on whether
he had filed a notice of appeal. Had he done such, Kimble's ability to
appeal his conviction would be lost.' If he fled prior to filing a notice
of appeal, however, Kimble's right to appeal would remain completely
intact.
4
In balancing the management of the appellate process with the
fugitive's ability to file an appeal, courts have been torn in two distinct
directions: on one hand, the judicial system strives to deter escape and
punish those who flee;' on the other hand, courts have fought to re-
main loyal to legal precedent and adhere to established law attempting
to provide due process for all.
1. THE FUGITIVE (Paramount Pictures 1993) was based on the original 1960s tele-
vision series starring David Jansen.
2. The Fugitive Dismissal Rule, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in Ortega-Rodri-
guez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993), can generally be defined as follows: "an
appellate court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who is a fugitive from justice
during the pendency of his appeal." Id. at 1203.
3. See Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam) (stating the
courts ability to dismiss an appeal of a defendant who escapes during the pendency
of his appeal); United States v. Amado, 754 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir. 1985) (holding that
courts possess the ability to dismiss an appeal with prejudice if appellant escapes
after filing the appeal); Shaw v. Estelle, 542 F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curi-
am) (stating that appeals of defendants who escape during pendency of appeal are
subject to immediate dismissal with prejudice).
4. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct at 1209 (holding a former fugitive's status
lacks the requisite "connection to the appellate process" to warrant dismissal of his
appeal).
5. See Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 541 (1975) (stating that deterring felony
escapes is one of the primary goals of the Fugitive Dismissal Rule).
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The ability of the courts to dismiss the appeal of a fugitive who
escapes after filing a timely appeal is well established in the Fugitive
Dismissal Rule.' Since the turn of the century, however, the Supreme
Court had yet to address the effect of a pre-appeal escape on the right
of a former fugitive to appeal his conviction. Finally in Ortega-Rodri-
guez v. United States, the Court first addressed the effects of such an
escape on the appellate rights of a former fugitive.7 The Court's holding
in Ortega-Rodriguez severely limits the authority of the courts to en-
force procedural rules establishing reasonable conditions on the exer-
cise of appellate jurisdiction! As a result of the Court's holding, defen-
dants who flee after filing a notice of appeal lose the right to appeal
their conviction; those who escape prior to filing, however, can appeal
an unfavorable judgment."
This Note takes the position that while the Court's intended purposes
for affirming the Fugitive Dismissal Rule are sound, the holding fails to
satisfy the intended goal and will instead result in long-term negative
impacts.'" The aims of the Court and the interests of society would be
better served by a modified version of the Fugitive Dismissal Rule."
This Note proposes a "Discretionary Dismissal Rule for Fugitives"
which would leave the ability of fugitives to appeal their convictions to
the discretion of the courts." This determination would be based on a
three-factor, case-by-case analysis."
This Note examines Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States in depth and
discusses the ramifications and repercussions of the case. Part II dis-
6. See Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366 (1970) (stating that courts may dismiss the ap-
peal of a defendant who escapes during the pendency of his appeal); Bonahan v. Ne-
braska, 125 U.S. 692, 692 (1887) (asserting appellate courts may refuse to hear the
appeal of a defendant who escapes during the pendency of his appeal); Smith v.
United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (declaring the courts ability to dismiss appeals of
fugitives who have filed for appeal); Amado, 754 F.2d at 32 (holding that courts pos-
sess the ability to dismiss the appeal of a defendant who escapes after filing a notice
of appeal); EsteUe, 542 F.2d at 955 (stating that appeals of defendants who escape
during pendency of appeal are subject to immediate dismissal with prejudice).
7. 113 S. Ct. at 1199.
8. Id. at 1209.
9. Id. at 1209-10.
10. See infra notes 276-310 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 292-310 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 294-310 and accompanying text.
13. This author's "Discretionary Dismissal Rule for Fugitives" is based on three fac-
tors, weighed by appellate courts in order to determine whether dismissal is appropri-
ate under the circumstances. The factors are:
(1) the length and effect of the fugitivity;
(2) the voluntary or involuntary return of the fugitive; and
(3) the nature of the claim asserted.
See infra notes 294-310 and accompanying text.
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cusses the historical background of the Fugitive Dismissal Rule, includ-
ing the power of appellate courts to decide such issues. 4 Part III ex-
amines the facts of Ortega-Rodriguez and the constitutional issues pre-
sented by the case.6 Part IV analyzes the majority and dissenting opin-
ions of the Court." Part V discusses the impact of the decision on the
former fugitives' ability to file an appeal, and provides a recommended
approach for future cases involving this issue. 7 Finally, Part VI will
provide a brief conclusion.'
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Fugitive Dismissal Rule originated in the late 1870s and has con-
tinued to evolve and expand ever since. Prior to examining the for-
mation and development of this rule, it is important to understand how
the basis for the courts' authority to create and enforce such a rule
emerged. For this reason, this section will begin with a brief discussion
of the courts' authority to institute rules affecting the appellate rights of
criminal defendants. It will then examine the development and evolu-
tion of the Fugitive Dismissal Rule from it inception in 1876' to its
most recent refinement by the Supreme Court.
A. Power of the Appellate Courts
Courts traditionally interpret the United States Constitution as provid-
ing no absolute right to an appeal.2 Instead, courts of appeal possess
the power to enforce procedural rules placing reasonable conditions on
the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction.' The Supreme Court first
established this principle in Thomas v. Arn,n where the Court held
14. See infra notes 19-97 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text
16. See infra notes 118-275 and accompanying text
17. See infra notes 276-310 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 311-15 and accompanying text
19. See Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876) (providing the first use of the
Fugitive Dismissal Rule). Despite its importance, few legal scholars or commentators
have discussed the Fugitive Dismissal Rule.
20. Id.
21. See Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 14647 (1985) (establishing the courts' author-
ity to adopt rules conditioning the ability to appeal); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651, 656 (1977) (stating there is no constitutional right to an appeal).
22. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 14647.
23. Id. at 140.
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that absent a conflict with the Constitution or a statute, a court of ap-
peal may exercise its supervisory power to formulate "procedural rules
governing the management of litigation."' Failure to abide by rules
promulgated by appellate courts may result in the loss of the right to
statutory appeal.' These rules have customarily provided the authority
to dismiss appeals of defendants who become fugitives after filing an
appeal of their lower court convictions.' These rules may be imple-
mented and enforced by the appellate courts provided that they are (1)
not inconsistent with the Constitution or a statute; (2) within the au-
thority of the courts to establish through adjudication; and (3) reason-
able in light of the interests they seek to promote.27 The Fugitive Dis-
missal Rule complies with all three requirements.
1. The Fugitive Dismissal Rule is not Inconsistent with the
Constitution or any Statute
It is well established that there is no constitutional right to appeal a
criminal conviction.' The Court, in Abney v. United States,2 deter-
mined that the right to appeal "is purely a creature of statute."' There-
fore, it must be determined whether the rule granting appellate courts
the authority to dismiss the appeal of a fugitive is inconsistent with any
statute. It appears that it is not.3' The statute providing criminal defen-
dants the right to appeal bestows jurisdiction upon the appellate court
"from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States."3
While this rule grants jurisdiction to the appellate courts, it does not
set forth the procedural rules that must be followed in order to exact
an appeal. The courts administer this task through judicially styled
rules' and adjudication.' The rules developed have created condi-
tions upon which the statutory right to appeal may be exercised. They
24. Id. at 146.
25. Id. at 147.
26. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
27. See Thomas, 474 U.S. at 145-48.
28. See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977); see also Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (stating that a "state is not required by Federal Constitution to
provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all"); McKane v. Durston,
153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894) (holding "[an appeal from a judgment of conviction is
not a matter of absolute right . .
29. Abney, 431 U.S. at 651.
30. Id. at 656.
31. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988 & Supp. 1993).
33. The rules referred to are the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
34. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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are not, however, inconsistent with the appellate jurisdiction granted by
25 U.S.C. § 1291.-
2. It is Within the Authority of the Courts to Establish
the Fugitive Dismissal Rule Through Adjudication
Traditionally, the courts of appeal have been granted broad rule-mak-
ing authority.' Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
grants courts of appeal with the power, through adjudication, to initiate
procedural rules, in addition to those legislatively mandated.' Rule 47
provides that, "[in all cases not provided for by rule, the courts of
appeals may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with
the [Federal Rules of Procedure]."' The Fugitive Dismissal Rule is not
inconsistent with these federal rules, and therefore, is properly devel-
oped through the course of adjudication.
3. A Fugitive Dismissal Rule Serves the Valid Interests Which it
Seeks to Promote
The Fugitive Dismissal Rule has expanded significantly since the late
nineteenth century. The Court first addressed this issue in Smith v.
United States.' In Smith, a criminal defendant filed an appeal of a
conviction by the state supreme court.' The defendant, however, fled
prior to its resolution.4' The Court held that it was within its discretion
to "refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party,
suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judg-
ment we may render."42 Therefore, the Court ordered the defendant's
35. See Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1985) (stating that the Court has the
power to "mandate procedures deemed desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial
practice").
36. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
37. FED. R. APP. P. 4; see also Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199,
1210 (1993) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (illustrating the Court's ability to initiate a pro-
cedural rule developed through adjudication).
38. FED. R. APP. P. 4.
39. 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
40. James R. Grippando, Comment, Fear of flying-The Fugitive's Fleeting Right
to a Federal Appeal, 54 FORDHAM L REv. 661; 664 (1986).
41. Id.
42. Smith, 94 U.S. at 97. It is interesting to note that the Court reached its deci-
sion with relative ease, using only one half of one page to relate its holding and
reasoning. Id.
appeal dismissed unless he surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of
the court." This holding paved the way for the development of the Fu-
gitive Dismissal Rule. Shortly after the Court decided Smith, it was
again faced with this issue. In Bonahan v. Nebraska," the defendant,
who appealed his conviction, fled prior to its settlement.' Again, as in
Smith, the Court held that the defendant must be within the jurisdic-
tion of the court prior to the last day of the term if the appeal was to
be considered.' Because the defendant was not within the jurisdiction,
the Court dismissed the appeal."7
The Court's decision in Smith created two important principles both
arising from the absence of the defendant. First, based on the
defendant's status as a fugitive, the Court could not force him to re-
spond to a judgment.' Second, because of the court's inability to en-
force its decision, it would be performing a vain and useless act.' This
second tenet was founded upon the rationale that if the defendant re-
fused to return for his appeal, he might decline to reappear for a retrial
if the court found in his favor.' The Court in Bonahan, however, de-
termined that the principle concerning the court performing a vain and
useless act, was not always applicable."' In that case, the defendant
claimed a violation of the Double Jeopardy principle.' As a result, he
sought acquittal rather than retrial.' Based on this holding, the Court
43. Id. The Court established the first day of the following term as the deadline
for the defendant to surrender himself to the jurisdiction of the court. After that
date, the opportunity to appeal his conviction would be lost. Id.
44. 125 U.S. 692 (1887).
45. Id.
46. Id. Again, the Court provided very little reasoning to explain how it reached
the aforementioned holding.
47. Id. In defining "being within the control of the court," Justice Waite stated that
either being in custody, or being out on ball, which constitutes constructive custody,
would suffice. Id.; see also Smith, 94 U.S. at 97 (interpreting "within the control of
the court" as meaning either in custody or out on bail).
48. Smith, 94 U.S. at 97.
49. Id. The Court reasoned that it would be performing a useless act because in
reality no matter what it decided, the defendant was unlikely to respond to the judg-
ment. Id. If the Court affirmed the criminal conviction the defendant would not likely
surrender himself, and if it reversed and ordered a new trial, the defendant still
might decide not to return. Id.
50. Id. The Court determined that a favorable decision for the defendant during an
appeal in his absence would result in a retrial of his case. Id.
51. See Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 (1887) (illustrating that the court only
requires that it to be unable to enforce the decision in order to dismiss an appeal).
52. Bonahan v. Nebraska, 24 N.W. 390 (Neb. 1886).
53. Id. Bonahan based his request on the fact that retrial after reversal would be
a violation of the Double Jeopardy clause of the Constitution. Id.; see, e.g., Burks v.
United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (holding that retrial after reversal of a conviction
would violate the Double Jeopardy clause, and as a result acquittal was the only
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determined that it need only be unable to enforce its decision as a basis
in order to dismiss the defendant's appeal.' The second criteria, con-
sisting of the performance of a useless act, need no longer be pres-
ent.M
The Court later affirmed, in Allen v. Georgia' the rationale for dis-
missal developed in Smith and clarified in Bonahan. In Allen, the de-
fendant filed a writ of error to the state supreme court concerning his
murder conviction and death sentence.67 Subsequent to his filing this
motion, but prior to a decree, the defendant fled the jurisdiction. As a
result, the state court dismissed his appeal.' The defendant then filed
a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court, asserting that the
state court's dismissal of his appeal based on his fugitive status was a
denial of due process.TM The Court affirmed the dismissal by the lower
court, holding that his escape eliminated his ability to appeal his con-
viction.'
Molinaro v. New Jersey"' is a more recent case that examined and
applied the principles created in Smith and Bonahan. In Molinaro, the
defendant was convicted for abortion and conspiracy to commit abor-
tion.' As in the previous cases, the defendant fled during the pendency
remedy available under the circumstances).
54. Bonahan, 125 U.S. at 692.
55. See id (illustrating that the Court considers the lack of enforceability the only
requirement for dismissal).
56. 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 139. It is interesting that the Court in A/Men retreated in one respect
from the holdings in Smith and Bonahan by reducing the deadline for the defendant
to return from the last day of the term to 60 days. Id.
59. Id. The Court denied the defendant's due process claim. The Court stated:
To justify any interference upon our part, it is necessary to show that the
course pursued has deprived, or will deprive, the plaintiff in error of his life,
liberty or property without due process of law. Without attempting to define
exactly in what due process of law consists ... it could only be in very
exceptional circumstances that this court would feel justified in saying that
there had been a failure of due legal process.
Id. at 140. The Court thus rejected the defendant's argument that dismissal of a writ
of error was a deprivation of fundamental rights which would allow the Court to inter-
vene. Id. at 141.
60. Id. After finding no violation of due process, the Court used the justifications
set forth in Smith and Bonahan to warrant dismissal of the defendant's appeal. Id.
61. 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam).
62. Id.
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of his appeal.' Based on the defendant's escape, the Court refused to
hear his appeal.' The Court stated, "[wjhile such an escape does not
strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or controversy, we
believe it disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources of the
Court for determination of his claims."' This holding affirmed the deci-
sions reached in Smith and Bonahan, while simultaneously expanding
the rule concerning dismissal of a fugitive's appeal in two significant
areas.
First, the two earlier decisions required the court to postpone dis-
missal until the last day of the term, while awaiting the fugitive's return
to the lower court's jurisdiction. In contrast, Molinaro featured immedi-
ate dismissal.' The Court stated that "[tihe dismissal need not await
the end of the Term or the expiration of a fixed period of time, but
should take place at this time." 7
Second, Bonahan and Smith allowed the defendant to reinstate his
appeal if he returned to the jurisdiction prior to the last day of the
term.' The Molinaro court gave no indication that an appeal may be
reinstated.' As a result of the Court's holding in Molinaro, the appeal
of a defendant who flees after filing a notice of appeal may be dis-
missed immediately, with prejudice, if he cannot be made to comply
with the court's decision. '
63. Id. In this case, the defendant was free on bail, which Smith and Bonahan
regard as constructive custody. See Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876); see
also Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 692 (1887) (stating bail is equivalent to con-
structive custody). When he failed to surrender himself to the court, the defendant's
bail was revoked and he was considered "a fugitive from justice." Molinaro, 396 U.S.
at 365.
64. Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366. The Court referred to Smith and Bonahan as pro-
viding justification for its dismissal of the defendant's appeal. Id. at 365.
65. Id. at 366.
66. Id. In Smith, the Court waited until the first day of the following term to
dismiss the appeal. Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 98 (1876). In contrast, the
Bonahan Court struck the appeal from the docket on the last day of the current
term. Bonahan, 125 U.S. at 692.
67. Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366. This followed the progression that had been devel-
oping in cases of this type. In Smith, the Court dismissed the appeal on the first day
of the subsequent term. Smith, 94 U.S. at 98. In Bonahan, the Court moved the date
up to the last day of the term during which the controversy arose. Bonahan, 126
U.S. at 692. In Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897), the Court again shortened the
deadline to allow only 60 days for defendants to surrender to the lower court's juris-
diction. Id. at 142. Immediate dismissal, as permitted in Molinaro, seemed to follow
the logical progression of the law. Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366.
68. See Bonahan, 125 U.S. at 692 (declaring the defendant's appeal may be placed
on the docket if he returns to the jurisdiction on or before the last day of the term);
see also Smith, 94 U.S. at 98 (stating the defendant may reinstate his appeal if he
returns to the jurisdiction).
69. Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366.
70. See United States v. Amado, 754 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir. 1985) (relying on
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On the heels of Molinaro, the Court reviewed Estelle v. Dorrough,7'
which upheld a statute mandating automatic dismissal of appeals by
defendants who escaped during the pendency of their appeal.' The
Court justified its holding in Estelle by stating that the statute met the
intended goal of discouraging felony escapes, while encouraging volun-
tary surrenders.3 In addition, the statute promoted the dignified opera-
tion of the court of appeals.74 This deviation from a theory of
disentitlement, toward promoting the dignified operation of the appel-
late courts and discouraging felony escapes, provided additional justifi-
cation for the Fugitive Dismissal Rule.
Since Estelle, the most significant case concerning a court's authority
to dismiss the appeal of a fugitive is United States v. Holmes.7" In
Molinaro the court stated "[tlhere can be no doubt of our authority to dismiss the
appeal with prejudice."); cf. Joensen v. Wainwright, 615 F.2d 1077, 1079 (5th Cir.
1980) (reasoning that a state court should have the same rights as the Supreme
Court in unconditionally dismissing an escapee's appeal); Shaw v. Estelle, 542 F.2d
954, 955 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (holding that the defendant's appeal was subject
to immediate dismissal with prejudice); United States v. Shelton, 508 F.2d 797, 798
(5th Cir.) (stating that in Molinaro, the Supreme Court altered its own practice by
dismissing a fugitive's appeal without first waiting to see if he returned to the juris-
diction), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975).
71. 420 U.S. 534 (1975).
72. Id. at 544. The statute referred to is Vernon's Texas Code of Criminal Proce-
dure Annotated, Article 44.09. The statute provides in pertinent part:
If the defendant, pending an appeal in the felony case, makes his escape
from custody, the jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals shall no lon-
ger attach in the case. Upon the fact of such escape being made to appear,
the court shall . . . dismiss the appeal; but the order dismissing the appeal
shall be set aside if it is made to appear that the defendant has voluntarily
returned within ten days to the custody of the officer from whom he es-
caped; and in cases where the punishment inflicted by the jury is death . . .
the court may in its discretion reinstate the appeal if the defendant is recap-
tured or voluntarily surrenders within thirty days after such escape.
Id. at 535 n.1 (quoting TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 44.09 (West 1966) (since
repealed and replaced by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 60(b)).
73. Id. at 537 (citing Rodriguez v. State, 457 S.W.2d 555, 556 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App.
1970)). This was the first time the Court proposed deterring felony escapes and en-
couraging voluntary surrender as a valid basis for dismissing the appeal of a criminal
defendant who flees.
74. Id. In Estelle, the Court considered for the first time, along with discouraging
felony escapes and promoting voluntary surrender, the validity of the dignified opera-
tion of the courts as a basis for dismissal.
75. 680 F.2d 1372 (lth Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983),
overru/ed by Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993).
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Holmes, the district court convicted the defendant on several charges,
including the violation of federal narcotics laws and possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon.'8 The defendant escaped, however, before
the date set for sentencing." Two years later, after his recapture, the
court sentenced the defendant for the crimes he conunitted, and the
defendant appealed.' The government moved to dismiss his appeal
based on his status as a former fugitive.m This marked the first attempt
by the court to dismiss the appeal of a defendant who escaped after his
conviction yet prior to filing for an appeal. The government argued that
although factually distinguishable from earlier cases, identical policy
considerations warranted dismissal in this case.' In its holding, the
court dismissed Holmes' appeal, stating "a defendant who flees after
conviction, but before sentencing, waives his right to appeal from the
conviction unless he can establish that his absence was due to matters
completely beyond his control.""
It is interesting that the court's decision in Holmes centers around its
proposed reliance on Molinaro. First, the court stated that it relied on
Molinaro in reaching its conclusion that the right to appeal is purely
statutory and can be waived by an escape, thereby postponing the ap-
peal for years after conviction.' The court concluded that the delay
caused by the defendant's flight provided sufficient basis to for dismiss-
al of an appeal filed after their recapture.' Second, the court stated
that "it would fly in the face of common sense and sound reason" to
allow former fugitives "to seek relief from the very legal system that
76. Id. at 1373.
77. Id. In Holmes, the "escape" was failure to appear for sentencing by a defen-
dant who was free on bail. Determining that bail functions as constructive custody,
the court ordered Holmes' bond forfeited and issued a warrant for his arrest. Id.; see
also Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 692 (1887) (asserting that a defendant free
on bail is actually in constructive custody and within the control of the court); Smith
v. United States, 94 U.S. 97, 97 (1876) (equating bail with constructive custody).
78. Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1373.
79. Id. The government relied on several cases illustrating that the court may dis-
miss the appeal of a defendant who flees during the pendency of his appeal. See
Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975); Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365
(1970); Estrada v. United States, 585 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Smith,
544 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Shelton, 508 F.2d 797 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 828 (1975).
80. Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1373; see also Brief for Petitioner at 13-14, Ortega-Rodri-
guez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993) (No. 91-7749).
81. Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1373. The Court expressly excluded from the scope of its
decision appeals based on an error in sentencing. Id.
82. Id. at 1373-74; see also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977)
(providing "[tihe right of appeal . . . is purely a creature of statute").
83. Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1374.
1056
[Vol. 22: 1047, 1995] The Fugitive Dismissal Rule
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
they previously had seen fit only to defy."' Although these statements
purported to rely on Molinaro, in actuality, they represented new crite-
ria for dismissing the appeal of a former fugitive who is recaptured
prior to filing a notice of appeal.
The power of the courts to unconditionally dismiss the appeal of a
former fugitive was expanded further by the Eleventh Circuit in United
States v. London.' In London, the defendant fled during the course of
the district court trial in which he and eleven other defendants faced
drug smuggling charges.' Despite the defendant's absence, the court
continued the trial and convicted the defendant in absentia.' Three
years later authorities recaptured the defendant and returned him to the
jurisdiction for sentencing.' Subsequent to his sentencing hearing, the
defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.' Based on the Fugitive Dis-
missal Rule, the government moved to dismiss the appeal, and the court
granted the motion.' The court determined that flight during trial was
no different than flight following conviction but prior to sentencing."
84. Id.
85. 723 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
86. Id. The indictment, which covered approximately 100 pages, charged the 12 de-
fendants with 36 counts related to drug smuggling. Id.
87. Id. Under Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, "a defendant
may be tried in absentia when he 'voluntarily absents himself after the trial has com-
menced.'" Id. at 1539 n.1 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(1)); see also Taylor v. Unit-
ed States, 414 U.S. 17, 18-20 (1973) (per curiam) (stating that the power of the trial
court to proceed in absentia is narrow); United States v. Gallo, 763 F.2d 1504, 1529
(6th Cir. 1985) (stating that the defendant can waive the right to be present at trial
by failing to make a timely objection, by voluntary absence, or through court per-
mission), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1068 (1986); United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137,
139 (5th Cir. 1979) (asserting that a defendant may, upon court permission to be
excused, waive his right to be present at trial); United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980,
987 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Jones, 514 F.2d 1331, 1332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(indicating that the trial may also be continued, absent the defendant, if he fails to
make a timely objection to the proceeding continuing in his absence).
88. London, 723 F.2d at 1539.
89. Id.
90. Id. Curiously, the court in London made no mention of its earlier dismissal of
the appeal of one of London's co-defendants. See United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d
971, 985 n.1 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). This dismissal, how-
ever, was distinguishable because the co-defendant filed his appeal and the court
dismissed it while he was still at large. London, 723 F.2d at 1539.
91. Id. As a matter of fact, the court stated, "the situation created by a defendant
who voluntarily absents himself during trial is even more problematic than those
encountered when the defendant absconds after the trial has concluded but prior to
sentencing." Id.
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This holding further clarified and expanded the holding in Holmes. The
court in Holmes focused on both the defendant's defiance of the legal
system and on the delay caused by the defendant's escape.' In con-
trast, the court in London focused solely on the defendant's disregard
for the integrity of the judicial process.' Thus, the court in London
firnly established preservation of the integrity of the judicial system as
independent grounds for dismissal.'
In the early cases of Smith, Bonahan, and Molinaro, the Supreme
Court established a rule permitting dismissal where a fugitive fled after
filing a notice of appeal.' In more recent cases, the lower federal
courts have expanded this rule to provide courts with the authority to
dismiss the appeal of a fugitive prior to filing an appeal, and in some
circumstances to former fugitives subsequent to their recapture.' This
expansion, allowing for the dismissal of a former fugitive's appeal, is a
reasonable exercise of the supervisory power of the courts. In United
States v. Ortega-Rodriguez, the Supreme Court again addressed the
Fugitive Dismissal Rule and its boundaries.'
HI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On November 8, 1988, Jose Antonio Ortega-Rodriguez, along with two
other crew members of the vessel Wilfred, were arrested by the Coast
Guard while fishing off the coast of Florida.' The three were tried and
convicted of possession of narcotics with the intent to distribute, in
addition to conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute over five
kilograms of cocaine.' Prior to sentencing on June 15, 1989, Ortega-
Rodriguez fled."°° He was sentenced in absentia to a prison term of
nineteen years and seven months, to be followed by five years of proba-
92. United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
93. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 39-70 and accompanying text.
96. The two major cases in which the federal courts have dismissed the appeal of
a fugitive who flees prior to filing a notice of appeal are: United States v. London,
723 F.2d 1538 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984); United States v. Holmes,
680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
97. See infra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
98. Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1202 (1993). The three de-
fendants were seized from the vessel headed toward Cuba. Id. The defendants
claimed that they, like many others, were fishing for dolphin. Id.; see also United
States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 655-57 (11th Cir. 1990) (providing a detailed
description of the facts surrounding the defendants' arrest), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 980
(1991).
99. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct at 1202.
100. Id.
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tionary release.'"' Although Ortega-Rodriguez's co-defendants appealed
their convictions, no such appeal was filed on his behalf."In
On May 24, 1990, eleven months after Ortega-Rodriguez's escape, the
authorities recaptured him pursuant to an arrest warrant issued by the
district court." The court found Ortega-Rodriguez guilty of contempt
of court and failure to appear, and resentenced him to an additional
twenty-one months to run subsequent to his sentence for the cocaine
charges.'" This sentence was to be followed by a three-year period of
supervised probation. Following his recapture, "his attorney filed a
'motion to vacate sentence and for resentencing,' as well as a motion
for judgment of acquittal.""M The district court denied this motion for
acquittal; however, the court granted the motion to vacate the earlier
sentence and to resentence. 7 The defendant was resentenced to a
prison term of fifteen years and eight months, followed by five years of
probation."M Immediately following the newly-entered judgment and
resentencing, Ortega-Rodriguez filed a timely appeal.M By now, the
court of appeal had already heard his co-defendants' appeals, with one
conviction affirmed and the other overturned because of insufficient
evidence."°
The government moved to dismiss Ortega-Rodriguez's appeal based
on the fact that he had become a fugitive following conviction but prior
to initial sentencing."' They argued that because of his fugitive status
101. Id. If a defendant voluntarily absents himself from the proceedings of a trial,
the trial court may continue in his absence. See Travis H.D. Lewin, Criminal Proce-
dure, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 240, 247 (1984).
102. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1202.
103. Id.
104. Id. The resentencing took place pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3551-3665, 3673, 3742 (1984). Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1202-03.
107. Id. at 1203.
108. Id.
109. Id. This series of events made Ortega-Rodriguez's situation "somewhat unusual."
Id. Applicable time limits would have barred his filing a timely appeal on his initial
sentence had the district court denied his motion for resentencing. Resentencing,
however, actually allowed Ortega-Rodriguez to file a timely appeal of the second sen-
tence. Id. at 1203 n.9.
110. Id. at 1202; see United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 660-63 (11th Cir.
1990) (overturning the conviction of Becerra-Flores due to insufficient evidence and
affirming the conviction of Mieres-Borges), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 980 (1991).
111. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1203.
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"'[u]nder the holding in Holmes, he cannot now challenge his 1989 con-
viction for conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute co-
caine.'""' The court of appeal granted the motion to dismiss."3 On
June 15, 1992, following a decision by the court of appeal to deny a
motion to reinstate the appeal and to reconsider the order dismissing
the appeal,"4 the Supreme Court granted certiorari."' The Court in a
five-four decision held that the defendant is not automatically precluded
from appealing a conviction when he is a fugitive during the pendency
of a district court proceeding but is recaptured before initiating an ap-
peal." Thus, the Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeal,
dismissing Ortega-Rodriguez's appeal and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion."'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Majority Opinion
The majority considered many important issues in its careful analysis
of Ortega-Rodriguez."8 The Court, however, appeared to focus its con-
clusions on the connection between the appellate process and the fugi-
tive status of the defendant. The Court's holding that the flight of a
defendant prior to filing a notice of appeal lacks the requisite connec-
tion to the appellate process to warrant the automatic dismissal of the
former fugitives appeal, merits further discussion.
First, the majority explained the basis for granting certiorari. The
Court began by restating the rule set forth in Holmes, whereby "a de-
fendant who flees following conviction, but prior to sentencing waives
his right to appeal from the conviction unless he can establish that his
absence was due to matters completely beyond his control.""9 The
majority then recognized that although the court of appeal for the Elev-
enth Circuit, in Holmes, examined the right to an appeal of a defendant
who flees post conviction, but prior to sentencing, the Stjpreme Court
had never considered whether flight during the pendency of a district
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. The Court granted the motion in the form of a per curiam order. Id.
114. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199
(1993) (No. 91-7749).
115. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 U.S. at 1200. The parties argued the case on Decem-
ber 7, 1992 and the case was decided on March 8, 1993. Id.
116. Id. at 1209-10.
117. Id. at 1210.
118. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion. Joining in the opinion were Justices
Blackmun, Scalia, Kennedy and Souter. Id. at 1201.
119. Id. (citing United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983)).
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court trial warranted forfeiture of the right to appeal of a defendant
who is recaptured prior to sentencing and appeal.' ° Thus, the majority
scrutinized the facts of the case, leading into an analysis of how the
facts apply to the permitted dismissal rules. 2'
The majority acknowledged that the facts of this case presented a
rather unusual situation: the district court resentenced the defendant
after recapture."2 Had the court refused to resentence him, his appeal
would have been barred by applicable time limits. Ia
The majority next examined the development of the Fugitive Dismiss-
al Rule and its justifications. The Court acknowledged that the accepted
dismissal rule utilized in this country for well over a century,' as set
forth in Smith v. United States," held that an appellate court may
dismiss the appeal of a defendant who escapes during his appeal."
The basis for this holding was provided by the fact that there was no
guarantee that any decision passed down by the court could be en-
forced against the defendant.'27 The Court stated that it reserved the
right to refuse to hear an appeal when the defendant was absent and
could not be made to respond to the judgment."n Thus, enforceability
was the frst justification for the Fugitive Dismissal Rule. The majority
made it clear, however, that enforceability is not the only basis for the
Fugitive Dismissal Rule."
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 98-117 and accompanying text.
122. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1203 n.9.
123. Id. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide the relevant time con-
straints for filing a timely appeal. Rule 4 states in pertinent part: "In a criminal case
the notice of appeal by a defendant shall be filed in the district court within 10 days
after the entry of the (i) judgment or order appealed from or (ii) a notice of appeal
by the Government." FED. R. APP. P. 4.
124. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct at 1203.
125. 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
126. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1203. For more information concerning Smith v.
United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876), see supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
127. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. CL at 1203.
128. Id.; see also Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189, 190 (1949) (dismissing the
appeal of the defendant because he could not be made to respond to the judgment);
Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692, 692 (1887) (asserting the court's authority to
dismiss the appeal of a defendant who could not be made to comply with a judg-
ment); Smith, 94 U.S. at 97 (holding defendant's appeal may be dismissed if the
court is unable to enforce its decision due to his flight).
129. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct at 1203. Other justifications for the rule proposed
by the Court which will be discussed further are: disentitlement, deterring felony es-
capes and encouraging voluntary surrender, and promoting the efficient dignified oper-
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The second premise for the rule was reiterated by the Court as it
appeared in Molinaro v. New Jersey." In Molinaro, the Court held
that although the flight of the defendant did not divest the case of its
adjudicable case or controversy, the flight "'disentitles the defendant to
call upon the resources of the Court for determination of his
claims.'" 3 ' The Court then sought support for its assertion that en-
forceability is not the only ground for the Fugitive Dismissal Rule"' by
citing Allen v. Georgia, where the Court upheld the dismissal of a
fugitive's appeal and refused to reinstate it after the defendant had been
recaptured where enforceability was no longer a concern." The ma-
jority attempted to strengthen its contention by introducing the Court's
holding in Estelle v. Dorrough," where the Court upheld a Texas stat-
ute calling for the automatic dismissal of appeals brought by defendants
who escaped during the pending appeal and who failed to return to the
jurisdiction within ten days."n The Court in Estelle relied on the deci-
sion in Molinaro, stating that the statute served "similar ends" of dis-
couraging felony escapes and encouraging voluntary surrender.'37 In
addition, the Court in Estelle stated that the statute promoted the "effi-
cient and dignified operation of the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals." " The Court reasoned that these were further justifications for
the Fugitive Dismissal Rule.'" The majority then carefully examined
the Court's holding in Estelle to illustrate cases that consistently and
decisively warranted the dismissal of an appeal when the appellant was
a fugitive during "the ongoing appellate process."'40 The majority then
ation of the courts. See infra notes 13042 and accompanying text.
130. 396 U.S. 365 (1970).
131. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1204 (citing Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366).
132. Id. (citing Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 365-66).
133. 166 U.S. 138 (1897).
134. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. CL at 1204.
135. 420 U.S. 534 (1975).
136. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1204; see supra notes 71-74 and accompanying
text for additional material addressing Estelle. See supra note 72 for the applicable
Texas statute upheld by the court in Estelle.
137. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1204 (citing EsteUe, 420 U.S. at 537). Although
the Court contends that it relied on Molinaro, this was the first time the Court pro-
posed deterring felony escapes and encouraging voluntary surrender as a valid basis
for dismissing the appeal of a criminal defendant who flees. Id.
138. Id. (quoting Estelle, 420 U.S. at 537). Again, this served as the first occasion
that the Court considered the dignified operation of the appellate courts as a valid
basis for dismissal.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Estelle, 420 U.S. at 542 n.11). This further discussion addressed the
rationale behind the Texas statute providing for the dismissal of a defendant's appeal
when flight occurs during the pendency of their appeal. Id. In determining that the
rule was reasonable, the Court quoted a portion of the opinion from Estelle-
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summarized the historical justifications for the Fugitive Dismissal
Rule. " ' The Court stated that dismissing the appeals of defendants
who become fugitives during the appellate process, as decided in Smith
v. United States and Bonahan v. Nebraska, served the legitimate inter-
ests of deterring future escapes and promoting the dignified, efficient
functioning of the appellate process.'
The majority then analyzed the development and expansion of the
Fugitive Dismissal Rule which took place in 1982, in Holmes v. United
States."4 According to the majority the government during this period,
convinced the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal that the rationale set
forth in Molinaro should be extended to include "the appeal of a 'for-
mer fugitive' returned to custody prior to sentencing and notice of ap-
peal." ' The court in Holmes recognized that the reasoning set forth in
Molinaro was "equally forceful" whether the escape takes place prior
to, or post sentencing.'5 This recognition arose from the court's real-
ization that all of the cases that the government relied upon involved
defendants who had become fugitives after their appeals had already
begun.' The Eleventh Circuit, in Holmes, focused on the prejudice
that may result from lengthy delays following presentencing escapes."'
Texas was free to deal more severely with those who simultaneously invoked
the appellate process and escaped from its custody than with those who first
escaped from its custody, returned, and then invoked the appellate process
within the time permitted by law. While each class of prisoners sought to es-
cape, the first did so in the very midst of their invocation of the appellate
process, -while the latter did so before returning to custody and commencing
that process.
Id. (quoting Estelle, 420 U.S. at 54142).
141. Id. at 1204-05. The justifications discussed thus far in the opinion were: en-
forceability, deterrence, and the efficient, dignified operation of the appellate process.
Id.
142. Id, This signified the first major shift in the development of the Fugitive Dis-
missal Rule. Enforceability and disentitlement were no longer the only justifications
for the rule. Deterring felony escapes and promoting the dignified, efficient function-
ing of the appellate process were added to the existing grounds for the rule. Id.
143. 680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
144. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1205. For additional material pertaining to
Holmes, see supra notes 75-84 and accompanying text.
145. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1205 (citing Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1374).
146. Id. (citing Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1373).
147. Id. The delays mentioned by the Court would create many situations in which
a meaningful appeal would be impossible. One delay is the possibility of reversal. In
that case, the government may be prejudiced by its inability to locate witnesses and
present evidence. Id. at 1205 n.13 (citing Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1374).
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The majority continued to explore the Fugitive Dismissal Rule by ex-
amining the three key aspects in which the rule in Holmes differed
from that in Molinaro."s First, unlike the rule in Molinaro, the rule set
forth in Holmes reaches defendants who flee during their district court
trials, as well as those who escape after filing for appeal."9 Second,
the rule in Holmes does not authorize dismissal of all appeals, but
rather it warrants only the dismissal of appeals based on the fugitive's
conviction." The final difference emphasized between the rules in
Molinaro and Holmes exists where Holmes calls for automatic dismiss-
al without the exercise of discretion. 5' In contrast, Molinaro allows
discretion as to the dismissal of the fugitive's appeal."u The majority
used these differences as a foundation for their rejection of an expan-
sion of the rule to include the dismissal of appeals filed by fugitives
prior to the filing of a notice of appeal."u The majority recognized the
Court's limited ability to review rules adopted by the appellate courts in
their supervisory capacity but restated the requirement that the rules
"represent reasoned exercises of the courts' authority."' " The majority
professed that, prior to the decision in Holmes, all of the justifications
providing support for the dismissal of pending appeals following flight
had some connection between the fugitive status of the defendant and
the appellate process, which would make such dismissal reasonable."
The majority argued that the justifications set forth diminish, and in
148. Id. at 1205.
149. Id. The rule which may be extracted from Molinaro warrants only the dismiss-
al of those defendant's appeals who escape during the pendency of their appeal. See
Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970). This is illustrated by the court's
opinion which states, "[njo persuasive reason exists why this Court should proceed to
adjudicate the merits of a criminal case after the convicted defendant who has
sought review escapes from the restraints placed upon him pursuant to the convic-
tion." Id. (emphasis added).
150. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1205. The Court rationalized this aspect of the
rule by stating that "flight cannot fairly be construed as a waiver of appeal from er-
rors occurring after recapture," and as such the former fugitive would be permitted
to appeal sentencing errors. Id. (citing Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1373).
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1205-06. This rejection, as discussed ifra, was based on the lack of
connection between the appellate process and the status of the former fugitive. See
infra notes 161-223 and accompanying text.
154. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1205. See also Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140,
146-48 (1985) (stating the Court's authority to review rules adopted by the appellate
courts).
155. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1205-06. The reasonableness standard set forth
in Thomas, is not the only reason for requiring such a connection. An additional
reason is set forth in the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure which limits the au-
thority of the courts of appeals to "rules governing the practice before those courts."
Id. at 1206 n.15 (citing FED. R. APP. P. 47).
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many cases disappear, when applied in situations where the defendant's
fugitive status never coincides with their appeal because his flight and
recapture took place during the pendency of the district court trial."
The majority then examined application of the justifications for the
rule to former fugitives in an attempt to support their rejection of the
rule's expansion to such individuals. The Court began by stating that
the enforceability justification, set forth in Smith v. United States,'
could not be rationalized in the case of a former fugitive." The princi-
ple behind the enforceability justification is that the defendant is be-
yond the control of the courts." In the case of a former fugitive, he is
recaptured and returned to the court, at which time the problem of
enforceability disappears."
The majority then attacked the assertion that dismissing the appeal of
a former fugitive serves the interests of promoting the efficient opera-
tion of the appellate courts.'' Admitting that any escape may "give
rise to a 'flurry of extraneous matters,'" which will cause the court to
"divert its attention from the merits of the case before it," " arguably
in the case of a fugitive who is recaptured, the delay, or "flurry," caused
by the escape will likely dissipate in the lower court, well before reach-
ing the appellate process. The majority reasoned that Ortega-Rodri-
guez is the perfect example of this principle wherein the delay caused
by flight prior to the filing of an appeal may affect the district court,
but will not reach the appellate process."
156. Id.
157. 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
158. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1206; see also Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S.
692 (1887) (stating enforceability is a valid basis for dismissal of a defendant's appeal
who flees after filing for review).
159. Cf. United States v. Gordon, 538 F.2d 914, 915 (1st Cir. 1976) (dismissing the
appeal of a defendant who has fled because it is unlikely that he will respond to an
unfavorable judgment), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979); Bonahan, 125 U.S. at 692
(dismissing the appeal of defendant who was not within the control of the court);
Smith, 94 U.S. at 97 (refusing to consider the appeal of a defendant who was not
"where he could be made to respond to any judgment").
160. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1206.
161. Id. This interest first appeared in Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975).
162. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1206 (quoting United States v. Puzzanghera, 820
F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 900 (1987)).
163. Id. Although the delay may exhaust itself, it is likely that the appellate process
will be affected by it, either directly or indirectly.
164. Id. at 1206 n.16. In Ortega-Rodriguez, the defendant's flight caused a 19 month
delay in the district court. Id. Because the district court resentenced him and he was
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The extension of the Fugitive Dismissal Rule to include former fugi-
tives not only fails to promote the efficient operation of the court, as
the Court further explained, it also does nothing to protect the "dignity
of an appellate court." " The majority, however, agreed that dismissal
is an appropriate punishment when escape on the part of a criminal de-
fendant "flouts" the authority of the court." The rationale behind the
disentitlement theory, first set forth in Molinaro, is that "'the fugitive
from justice has demonstrated such disrespect for the legal processes
that he has no right to call upon the court to adjudicate his claim.'"" 7
Based on this view, the majority asserted that it is completely within
the authority of the appellate court to dismiss the appeal of a defendant
who has filed a notice of appeal prior to taking flight."M The majority,
however, made it clear that this authority does not extend to fugitives
who flee and are recaptured prior to filing for an appeal." The Court
reasoned that a defendant who flees anytime prior to filing a notice of
appeal flouts the authority of the district court and not that of the ap-
pellate court.7 ' Therefore, the appellate court does not have the au-
able to file a timely appeal, there was no delay in the appellate process. Id. The ma-
jority explained that had a notice of appeal been filed on the petitioner's behalf, the
appellate process may have been affected by delays from rescheduling an appeal
already on the docket Id. Based on the fact that no notice of appeal had been filed,
the majority stated "a lapse of time that precedes invocation of the appellate process
does not translate, by itself, into delay borne by the appellate court." Id.
165. Id. at 1206; cf. EsteUe, 420 U.S. at 537 (stating that protecting the dignity of
the courts is grounds for dismissing a defendant's appeal).
166. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1206; see, e.g., United States v. DeValle, 894
F.2d 133, 138 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding valid the dismissal of a defendant's appeal
after 8 months of fugitive status); United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134, 137-38 (2d
Cir. 1988) (stating fugitivity flouts the judicial process, and thus warrants dismissal);
Al v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 958-59 (3d Cir. 1986) (asserting the Court's authority to
dismiss an appeal based on the disrespect shown the judicial process by the
defendant's escape); United States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir.) (declar-
ing that the defendant's flight during trial disentitled him to call upon the resources
of the court to determine his claim), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
167. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1206 (quoting All v. Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 959
(3d Cir. 1986)); see also Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam)
(setting forth the disentitlement theory).
168. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1206-07; see also EsteUe, 420 U.S. at 534 (stat-
ing that the court may dismiss the appeal of a defendant who escapes after filing a
notice of appeal); Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 365 (1970) (holding that courts may dismiss
the appeal of defendants who flee during the pendency of their appeal); Bonahan v.
Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 (1887) (dismissing the appeal of a defendant who fled after
seeking review); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876) (holding that the appeal of
a fugitive who flees after filing a notice of appeal may be dismissed).
169. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1207.
170. Id.; see United States v. Anagnos, 853 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1988) (declining to
follow Holmes because the former fugitive's malfeasance occurred in the lower court
and should not affect the appellate court).
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thority to sanction the former fugitive, rather it is the district court
which possesses this ability.'71 Consequently, the majority refused to
support an expansion of the rule extending authority to the appellate
courts to levy sanctions via dismissal against former fugitives." This,
the majority asserted, would be too broad an application, and would
result in unwarranted dismissals of appeals."7 Justice Stevens pro-
fessed that none of the cases to date warrant such and expressed the
majority's refusal to adopt such a wide reaching approach.'7" Justice
Stevens continued, declaring that extending the Holmes rule to include
former fugitives, returned to custody, cannot be based on the
disentitlement theory set forth in Molinaro."5
The majority then proceeded to attack the expansion of the rule
based on the theory of deterrence set forth in Estelle."" They asserted
that the duty to deter escape must rest with the court where jurisdic-
171. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1207. The ability to sanction a defendant who
disrespects the court is granted by title 18 of the United States Code. Section 401(3)
of title 18 states in pertinent part "[A] court of the United States shall have the
power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its au-
thority, and none other as ... [d]isobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, pro-
cess, order, rule, decree or command." Id. at 1202 n.3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 401(3)
(1988)).
172. Id. at 1207. In support of the Court's refusal to extend the rule, the majority
cites Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Id. at 1206 rL15. Rule 47
"authorizes the promulgation of rules by the courts of appeals, [and] limits that au-
thority to rules 'governing the practice' before those courts." Id. (quoting FED. R. APP.
P. 47).
173. Id. at 1207. The majority illustrated this by hypothesizing the case of an indi-
vidual who flees for only a single day during their lower court trial. Id. The majority
concluded that application of the overbroad rule would permit the dismissal of his
appeal. Id. This type of dismissal is simply not defensible. Id. In support of this,
Justice Stevens noted that even the Eleventh Circuit would reject such a broad ap-
plication. Id. at 1207 n.17. Justice Stevens stated, "[if appellate dismissal were indeed
an appropriate sanction for all acts of judicial defiance, then there would be no rea-
son to exempt sentencing errors from the scope of the Holmes rule." Id. The majori-
ty asserted that indiscriminate dismissal by the appellate court is an inappropriate
punitive measure for misconduct by criminal defendants. Id. This, it is alleged, is true
whether or not the distinction between appeals arising from sentencing errors, and
appeals initiated by convictions is "logically supportable." Id.; see also Anagnos, 853
F.2d at 2 (examining the distinction between appeals based on sentencing errors and
appeals from convictions).
174. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1207.
175. Id. The disentitlement theory set forth in Molinaro is insufficient on its own to
justify the dismissal of an appeal by a former fugitive. Id.
176. Id. (citing Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975)).
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tion exists.'" Until the defendant files a notice of appeal, the jurisdic-
tion rests with the district court and any sanctions to deter escape must
be imposed by the district court. 8 Once the offender files the notice
of appeal, then and only then, is it appropriate for the appellate court
to dismiss the appeal of a defendant as a means of deterring escape."m
The majority then applied this argument to the case at hand. They pro-
fessed that as a result of Ortega-Rodriguez's escape, the district court,
as the one flouted, maintained the best opportunity to impose an appro-
priate punishment.'" In this case punishment consisted of a term of
imprisonment of twenty-one months, followed by a three year period of
probation."8 ' The majority concluded this portion of its opinion by
stating that flight is a separate crime which should be dealt with by the
court possessing jurisdiction.'" In the case of the former fugitive who
fled prior to filing a notice of appeal, this would be the district
court."in Allowing the appellate court to dismiss the defendant's appeal
would be, in effect, a second punishment."n Justice Stewart, in EsteUe
v. Dorrough," stated that "punishment by appellate dismissal intro-
duces an element of arbitrariness and irrationality into sentencing for
escape."" The majority stated that this arbitrariness will result in the
177. Id.
178. Id. The district court has at its disposal many sanctions that can be used to
deter felony escape. Id. See Katz v. United States, 920 F.2d 610, 613 (9th Cir. 1990)
(stating that when a defendant is in front of the district court, "the disentitlement
doctrine does not stand alone as a deterrence to escape").
179. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1207. As support for its position, the majority
noted that if deterrence fails and the defendant flees, the district court is well
equipped to impose a wide variety of sanctions which are suitable under the particu-
lar circumstances. Id. On the other hand, the appellate court has only the power of
dismissal, which may not be the most appropriate punishment. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1202, 1207. The district court was able to impose such a penalty under
title 18 of the Criminal Code. Section 401 provides in pertinent part: "A court of the
United States shall have the power to punish by fine or imprisonment, at its discre-
tion, such contempt of its authority .... " Id. at 1202 n.3 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 401(3)
(1988)).
182. Id. at 1207.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1207-08. Justice Stevens claimed that dismissing the defendant's appeal in
this case would be imposing an additional punishment of 15 years, added to the 21
months assessed by the district court. Id.; cf. United States v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928,
930 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984) ("We refrain from punishing the defendant twice by dismissing
his appeal.").
185. 420 U.S. 544, 545 (1975).
186. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1208 (quoting EsteUe, 420 U.S. at 544-45). Ac-
cording to the majority:
[Tihe statute imposes totally irrational punishments upon those subject
to its application. If an escaped felon has been convicted in violation of law,
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exact type of disparity that the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984" and
the Sentencing Guidelines" proposed to eradicate."
The majority proceeded to restate their position supporting the dis-
missal of appeals by fugitives who fled during the appeal period and
opposing the dismissal of the appeals by former fugitives who are re-
turned to custody prior to filing a notice of appeal."g Their position
focused on the different interests served in each particular instance.'
The majority stated that the court must base the dismissal of a
defendant's pending appeal on some connection between the
defendant's fugitive status and the "ongoing appellate process." "92 Ab-
sent this connection, the dismissal remains unwarranted.'" The ma-
jority conceded that in certain circumstances, events occurring within
the district court give rise to a requisite connection which is sufficient
to warrant dismissal by the appellate court."4 Under these
his loss of his right to appeal results in his serving a sentence that under
law was erroneously imposed. If, on the other hand, his trial was free of
reversible error, the loss of his right to appeal results in no punishment at
all. And those whose convictions would have been reversed if their appeals
had not been dismissed serve totally disparate sentences, dependent not upon
the circumstances of their escape, but upon whatever sentences may have
been meted out under the invalid convictions.
Id. at 1208 n.20 (quoting Estelle, 420 U.S. at 544).
187. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1984).
188. The United States Sentencing Commission drafted the Sentencing Guidelines
through the authority enumerated by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. See Charles
J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion? Reflections on the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 101 H.tv. L REV. 1938, 1945-46 (1988).
189. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1208. See generally Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989) (addressing the purpose of the Sentencing Reform Act and Sen-
tencing Guidelines).
190. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1208. This position is consistent with the Fugi-
tive Dismissal Rule which has been in operation in this country for well over a cen-
tury. See generally Estelle, 420 U.S. at 534 (stating the court may dismiss the appeal
of a defendant who escapes after filing a notice of appeal); Molinaro v. New Jersey,
396 U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam) (holding courts may dismiss the appeal of defen-
dants who flee during the pendency of their appeal); Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125 U.S.
692 (1887) (dismissing the appeal of a defendant who fled after seeking review);
Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876) (holding the appeal of a fugitive who flees
after filing a notice of appeal may be dismissed).
191. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1208.
192. Id. (quoting Estelle, 420 U.S. at 542). This connection is satisfied where the de-
fendant is not within the control of the court during his appeal. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id,
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circumstances, the appellate court may exercise its authority and dis-
miss an appeal' based solely on fugitive status which predates the ap-
peal.'" In an attempt to clarify this statement, the majority outlined
several situations which may authorize dismissal based on fugitive sta-
tus.
The first situation, discussed in Holmes, occurs when the defendant
is recaptured and resentenced prior to filing for appeal." The majority
agreed that dismissal may be warranted based on the prolonged
fugitivity that may delay the appeal and therefore prejudice the govern-
ment in locating witnesses and presenting evidence at retrial."' The
majority, however, stated that appeals based on insufficiency of evi-
dence, like Ortega-Rodriguez, lack the possibility of prejudice against
the government and as such do not merit dismissal.'9
Additionally, the majority recognized the appellate courts' ability to
dismiss the appeal of a former fugitive when the defendant's miscon-
duct makes "'meaningful appeal impossible.'"" Under such circum-
stances, the appellate courts reserve the right to manage such cases as
necessary." Although the majority acknowledged certain situations
195. Id.
196. Id. In Holmes, the defendant was convicted for violating federal narcotics laws
and possessing a firearm. United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1372 (1lth Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983). The defendant failed to appear for sentenc-
ing and remained a fugitive for two years. Id. Following his recapture and sen-
tencing, the defendant filed a timely appeal. Id.
197. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct at 1208. (citing Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1374); see
also United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he delay occa-
sioned by the period of a defendant's flight can prejudice the government should a
new trial be ordered after a successful appeal."). This would only apply in situations
where the relief sought is retrial. See Grippando, supra note 40, at 695. In some
instances, the defendant may be seeking acquittal, which, if granted, would not create
any prejudice on the government. Id.
198. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1208. If the court determines that there was
insufficient evidence to support the defendant's conviction, the decision will be re-
versed and no retrial will occur. Id. Thus, the government will not be prejudiced by
their inability to locate witnesses or present evidence. Id.
199. Id. at 1208-09 n.23 (quoting Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1374). It is interesting to note
that in addition to situations where the defendant makes a "meaningful appeal impos-
sible," the majority included circumstances where the defendant's conduct "otherwise
disrupt[s] the appellate process so that an appellate sanction is reasonably imposed."
Id. at 1209. The majority, however, failed to define situations which may satisfy this
test.
200. Id. For example, in this case the defendant's escape prevented the consolida-
tion of his appeal with that of his co-defendants. According to the majority, if the
court found this to create a significant enough interference with the operation of the
appellate process, dismissal would be warranted. Id. The majority, however, did not
feel that the Eleventh Circuit reached the conclusion that the interference was suf-
ficient. Id.
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that would permit the appellate court to dismiss the appeal of a former
fugitive, the majority refused to accept the argument that courts may
only consider dismissal on a case-by-case basis." The majority instead
proposed that although dismissal is always discretionary, 2 appellate
courts may develop general rules to cover specific, recurring situations
that would trigger exercise of this discretion.' The rationale behind
this argument is that the Holmes rule is overly broad and therefore
reaches too many appeals, including situations in which the defendant's
fugitive status has no effect on the appellate process.'
The majority then applied the principles discussed above to Ortega-
Rodriguez.' In the instant case, the defendant's escape prevented the
court of appeal from consolidating his appeal with that of his co-defen-
dants, a customary practice in the appellate process.' The majority
acknowledged that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal has jurisdiction
over whether the disruption of the appellate process, caused by the
defendant's flight, acted as sufficient interference to warrant the dis-
missal of Ortega-Rodriguez's appeal. 7 The majority, however, did not
believe that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal determined that the
interference was significant enough.m The majority pointed out that
the Holmes rule, applied by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal in this
case, focused on a lower standard than 'the Court now requires.' Re-
quiring more than an act of judicial defiance, the Court demanded that
there be the requisite connection between the fugitive's status and the
appellate process.2 0 As a result, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal's
201. Id. at 1209 n.23. (citing Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970)).
202. The appeal is discretionary in the sense that the status of the defendant, as a
fugitive, does not 'strip the case of its character as an adjudicable case or contro-
versy.'" Id. (quoting Molinaro, 396 U.S. at 366).
203. Id. Examples of such recurring situations were defined by the Court as: situa-
tions where the government is prejudiced in locating witnesses or presenting evi-
dence, and circumstances where meaningful appeal is made impossible by the
defendant's escape. Id. at 1208-09.
204. Id at 1209 n.23.
205. Id. at 1209.
206. Id.; see also United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 654 n.1 (1lth Cir.
1990) (recognizing Ortega-Rodriguez was absent and not a party to the appeal by
Mieres-Borges), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 980 (1991).
207. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1209.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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dismissal of this case, under Holmes, is insufficient to assert that the
dismissal would be appropriate under these narrower standards. 1'
The majority continued by noting that there is no showing in the
records that the defendant's former fugitive status had any significant
adverse effects which would interfere with orderly appellate review."'
Justice Stevens stated, under the standards used today, that the disrup-
tion of the appellate process simply was inadequate to warrant the
dismissal of the defendant's appeal.2"'
The majority determined that no federal rule or case law mandates
that there be uniformity among the circuits in their approach to Fugi-
tive Dismissal Rules.2"4 The only requirement is that appellate rules
meet the reasonableness standard set forth in Thomas v. Am.2"' Dis-
missal of an appeal under this rule requires that there be an adequate
connection, typically defined as "some connection," 6 between the
defendant's fugitive status and the appellate process."7 As long as the
individual rules meet this requirement, their application may vary con-
siderably."'
The majority concluded by stating that when a defendant escapes and
is recaptured prior to filing a notice of appeal, it may lack the requisite
connection to the appellate process to mandate dismissal of such an ap-
peal.219 The majority restated its opinion that misconduct which takes
place on the district court level should be sanctioned by the district
court itself.' Flight which occurs during the pendency of an appeal,
however, demonstrates contempt for the appellate process and justifies
the appellate court's exercise of its dismissal power"2 as set forth in
211. Id.
212. Id. The Court looked to both the government's motion to dismiss, as well as
to the Eleventh Circuit's per curiam order. Id. The delay caused by the severance of
the defendant's appeal from that of his co-defendants, and the duplication of resourc-
es which will be caused by this, was summarily dismissed by Justice Stevens' majori-
ty opinion. Id.
213. Id. The Court instead left the determination of the severity and effect of the
delay to the court of appeals on remand. Id.
214. Id. at 1209 n.24.
215. Id. (citing Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140 (1985)).
216. This standard requiring "some connection" was developed in Thomas, 474 U.S.
at 157 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
217. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1209 n.24.
218. Id. Based on this factor, the majority stated "we hesitate to decide as a gener-
al matter whether and under what circumstances preappeal flight that leads to sever-
ance of codefendants' appeals will warrant appellate dismissal, and instead leave that
question to the various courts of appeals." Id.
219. Id, at 1209.
220. Id.
221. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210. This decision affirmed the rule estab-
lished in the late 19th century and its use since its inception. See Estelle v.
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Molinaro.' The majority concluded the opinion by vacating the judg-
ment of the court of appeal and remanding the case for further review
consistent with the opinion.'
B. Dissenting Opinion
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the dissenting opinion, which attacked
the majority's position on the lack of connection between the former
fugitive and the appellate process.' The dissent began by making two
strong assertions. First, Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that "[tihe
only difference between a defendant who absconds preappeal and one
who absconds postappeal.is that the former has filed a notice of appeal
while the latter has not." ' This distinction, according to the dissent,
is insufficient to support the majority's claim that the connection be-
tween the appellate process and the fugitive is inadequate.' If the de-
fendant flees pre-filing, the chance that the appellate process will be
disrupted is just as great as if he waits until the appellate court obtains
jurisdiction and then flee." Chief Justice Rehnquist emphasized that
the dissent agreed with the majority that there must be a sufficient con-
nection between fugitive flight and the appellate process in order to
dismiss the fugitive's appeal, but disagreed with the majority's theory
that recapture prior to filing for appeal breaks that connection.
Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534 (1975) (stating that the court may dismiss the appeal of a
defendant who escapes after filing a notice of appeal); Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396
U.S. 365 (1970) (per curiam) (holding that courts may immediately dismiss the appeal
of defendants who flee during the pendency of their appeal); Bonahan v. Nebraska,
125 U.S. 692 (1887) (dismissing the appeal of a defendant who fled after seeking re-
view); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S. 97 (1876) (holding that the appeal of a fugitive
who flees after filing a notice of appeal may be dismissed).
222. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct at 1210.
223. Id.
224. Id. Joining in the dissenting opinion were Justices White, O'Connor, and Thom-
as.
225. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
226. Id. For a discussion on the majority's assertion regarding the requisite connec-
tion to the appellate process, see supra notes 190-204 and accompanying text
227. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct at 1210 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Under either
circumstance the appellate court will be delayed in hearing the case for the period
the defendant can elude law enforcement officials. Id. Thus, the dissent failed to see
why the authority to dismiss the appeal of a fugitive should be dependent on the
timing of the defendant's escape. Id.
228. Id. In footnote 1, the dissent stated that the Court incorrectly struck down the
Holmes rule based on the fact that "it reached too many appeals." Id. at 1210 n.1
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The dissent supported its assertion by examining the appellate court's
"supervisory power to create and enforce 'procedural rules governing
the management of litigation.' " ' There are only two limitations on the
court's authority to create these rules. First, the rules may not vio-
late the Constitution or any statute."' Second, the rules must be rea-
sonable in light of the interests they seek to address.' The dissent ad-
dressed these two requirements individually. First, the dissent stated
that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision, based on the Fugi-
tive Dismissal Rule as employed in that case, did not violate the Consti-
tution because the defendant had no constitutional right to an ap-
peal.'m For that matter, no criminal defendant has the constitutional
right to appeal.' In addition, the Fugitive Dismissal Rule implemented
by the Court of Appeal did not violate federal statute' 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, which grants criminal defendants the right to appeal. The dis-
sent pointed out, however, that this statute does not provide the
grounds for exacting an appeal.' Instead, those requirements are
found in Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, which
states that all courts of appeals have the authority to create rules regu-
lating their practices through adjudicative or rule-making processes.'
The dissent then addressed the second limitation on the court's authori-
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
229. Id. at 1210 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140,
146 (1985) (acknowledging "the power of the courts to mandate procedures deemed
desirable from the viewpoint of sound judicial practice").
230. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
231. Id. This rule does not violate either.
232. Id.; see also Thomas, 474 U.S. at 146-48 (stating procedural rules must be rea-
sonable in relation to the interests they seek to promote). For a discussion of the
reasonableness of the rule, see supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text
233. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977) (asserting a criminal defendant has
no constitutional right to appeal).
234. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956); see also Abney, 431 U.S. at 656
(stating criminal defendants have no constitutional right to appeal); McKane v.
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687-88 (1894) (declaring the Constitution does not provide the
right to appeal a criminal conviction).
235. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
236. Id.
237. Id. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47 states in pertinent part-
Each court of appeals by action of a majority of the circuit judges in regular
active service may from time to time make and amend rules governing its
practice not inconsistent with these rules. In all cases not provided for by
the rule, the courts of appeals may regulate their practice in any manner not
inconsistent with these rules.
FED. R. App. P. 47.
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ty. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Fugitive Dismissal Rule is
reasonable in light of the concerns it is aimed at protecting.'
The dissent then examined several of these interests in an attempt to
validate the Fugitive Dismissal Rule.' Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
the Court's decision in two earlier cases.' In Molinaro v. New Jer-
seyu the Court held that a defendant who flees during his appeal for-
feits his right to "'call upon the resources of the Court for determina-
tion of his claims. '"' The dissent determined that with few exceptions
this principle should apply to former fugitives as well as to fugitives
who abscond during the appellate process. 4 ' In Estelle v.
Dorrough,' the Court upheld a decision relying on a state statute per-
mitting the court to dismiss the appeal of a fugitive who fled after in-
yoking the appellate court's jurisdiction." The Court reasoned that
the statute discouraged felony escape, encouraged voluntary surrenders,
and promoted "'the efficient, dignified operation of the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals.'"' Relying on the decisions of the Court in these
two cases, the dissent emphasized that a reviewing court may "implore
procedural rules to protect its jurisdiction and to ensure the orderly
and efficient" use of scarce judicial resources. u7 The Fugitive Disniss-
238. Ortega-Rodriquez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). For a discus-
sion on the reasonableness of the Fugitive Dismissal Rule, see supra notes 39-97 and
accompanying text
239. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 1210-11 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
241. 396 U.S. 365 (1970).
242. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing
Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970)). In Molinaro, the defendant was
tried and convicted for abortion and conspiracy to commit abortion. Molinaro, 396
U.S. at 365. The defendant was free on bail but failed to surrender himself to author-
ities. Therefore, the court revoked defendant's bail and dismissed his appeal. Id.
243. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see United
States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that courts may dismiss the
appeal of a former fugitive who files for appeal after being recaptured), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
244. 420 U.S. 534 (1975).
245. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Estelle
v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 537 (1975)). In Estelle, the defendant was convicted of
robbery and sentenced to 25 years in prison. Estelle, 420 U.S. at 534. After filing a
notice of appeal, the defendant escaped from the Dallas County Jail in a stolen mail
truck. Id. He was recaptured two days later. Id. at 534-35.
246. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1210-11 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (citing
Estelle, 420 U.S. at 537).
247. Id. at 1211 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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al Rule, which would allow for the dismissal of a former fugitive's ap-
peal, promotes these same interests and, is therefore, reasonable.'
The dissent then repeated its earlier assertion that the majority's
finding of an insufficient connection between the defendant's flight and
the appellate process is unfounded.u' According to the dissent, it is
implausible to suggest that a defendant who escapes prior to filing an
appeal will not have an effect on the appellate process for the mere
reason that he has not yet filed a petition for appeal.'e Indeed, the dis-
sent observes that while flight prior to appeal may have less of an ef-
fect than flight that occurs during the appeal, there is a substantial
effect nonetheless." The dissent points out that if, as here, the defen-
dant flees prior to appeal and is later recaptured, he will delay the ap-
pellate process for at least as long as he evades law enforcement offi-
cials.' Additionally, the defendant will gain a second opportunity to
file a timely appeal if he is resentenced following recapture.'
The dissent voiced its opposition to the majority's assertion that "'any
concomitant delay... likely will exhaust itself well before the appellate
tribunal enters the picture.'"' This is not always true. Such a delay,
according to the dissent, will result, at the least, in an increase in the
size of the court's docket and its organization.' Furthermore, the dis-
sent emphasized that the delay caused by defendants who flee prior to
248. Id. Although the dissent did not expressly assert this, it is reasonably inferred
from the dissent's argument that the Eleventh Circuit's power to dismiss the
defendant's appeal did not violate the Constitution or any federal statute. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. Here, Ortega-Rodriguez eluded the authorities for 11 months. Id. at 1202
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also United States v. Sudthisa-Ard, 17 F.3d 1205 (9th
Cir.) (addressing the appeal of a defendant who evaded law enforcement officials for
15 years), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1386 (1994); United States v. Bravo, 10 F.3d 79 (2d
Cir. 1993) (dismissing the appeal of a defendant who remained a fugitive for 15
years); United States v. Parrish, 887 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (dismissing the appeal
of a defendant who remained at large for over 14 years).
253. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1211 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting). This is only
true if the court resentenced the defendant. If the district court denied his motion
for resentencing, applicable time limits would have barred the defendant from filing a
timely appeal on his initial sentence and judgment. Id. at 1203 n.9 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
dissenting). According to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of appeal
must be filed within 10 days of a criminal conviction. FED. R. APP. P. 4(b). Ortega-
Rodriguez was only able to file a timely appeal because the district court decided to
resentence him. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1203 n.9 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
254. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1204-05 (Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
255. Id. at 1211. The nonexistence of a Fugitive Dismissal Rule would force the ap-
pellate court to entertain the appeal of a former fugitive, provided with a second op-
portunity to file for a timely appeal. Id.
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filing, but are recaptured and then file a timely appeal, increases "expo-
nentially" with each individual who does so.'s
Chief Justice Rehnquist then addressed the effect that this delay has
on other areas of the appellate process. Such effects include forcing a
severance, requiring duplication of appellate procedures, and increasing
the number of inconsistent judgments.2 7 In the case at hand, the
defendant's flight delayed the appellate process for roughly nineteen
months.'
The dissent asserted that the defendant's flight in this case adversely
affected the appellate process, and thus, the appellate court should
have the authority to dismiss the defendant's appeal.'
In addition, the dissent emphasized the other interests supported by
the Eleventh Circuit's expanded version of the Fugitive Dismissal Rule.
First, it deters flight by convicted defendants.'s Conversely, the
majority's holding not only does not deter flight, but it encourages de-
fendants who know that they are going to attempt to escape do so prior
to filing an appeal.2 8' The majority failed to recognize that if the fugi-
tive is later recaptured and resentenced, he may still file a timely ap-
peal.'m Under the majority's rule, if the judge refuses the opportunity
256. Id. The majority failed to explain how this delay is eliminated by the fact that
the defendant is recaptured prior to filing the appeal. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. This period includes the period the defendant was a fugitive and the time
that it took the district court to resentence him. During this 19 month delay, the
court of appeals heard and decided the appeals of the co-defendants in this case. Id.;
see United States v. Mieres-Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 663 (1990) (affirming the conviction
of Mieres-Borges and overturning the conviction of Beccera-Flores), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 980 (1991). Had Ortega-Rodriguez not been a fugitive during this period, his
appeal would have been combined with that of his co-defendants. Ortega-Rodriguez,
113 S. Ct. at 1211-12 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Instead, the defendant's flight
forced the appellate court to hear two appeals arising from one case. Id. The court
was also concerned that the defendant's escape increased the possibility of inconsis-
tent judgments. Id. at 1212.
259. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1212 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent
supported this assertion by quoting from the brief filed by the government in this
case, stating, "[p]etitioner's flight 'imposed exactly the same burden of duplication on
the court of appeals that it would have if he had filed his notice of appeal before
absconding.'" Id, (quoting Brief for United States at 21, Ortega-Rodriguez v. United
States, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993) (No. 91-7749)).
260. Id. at 1212. EsteUe recognized deterrence of felony escape as a justification for
the Fugitive Dismissal Rule. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
261. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1212 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
262. Id. According to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, a criminal defen-
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to file an appeal, the fugitive is in no worse situation than if he escaped
post filing.2 Second, the majority's holding fails to encourage volun-
tary surrenders.2 Encouraging voluntary surrenders, the dissent
points out, is an "obvious interest" supporting the Eleventh Circuit's
Fugitive Dismissal Rule.a'
The dissent also asserted that a rule authorizing the dismissal of a
former fugitive's appeal secures the dignified operation of the judicial
system.' Any time a defendant elects to abscond, the authority of the
entire legal process is flouted. 7 The dissent stated that no fugitive
plans on voluntarily returning to the system and therefore is displaying
disrespect for all levels of the judicial process including the trial and
appellate level.'s
Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded the dissenting opinion by pointing
out that the majority's rule is not entirely unsatisfactory, but merely too
narrow.2" The majority's holding limits the use of the Fugitive Dis-
missal Rule to situations where the flight of a convicted defendant
causes a "'significant interference with the operation of the appellate
process,"'270 or where "'a meaningful appeal is impossible,'" or where
the severance of appeals is forced due to the flight." The dissent de-
clared that this excludes situations where the defendant's flight causes
such delay in the appellate process as to create adverse effects.' The
dant has 10 days following the entry of final judgment to file his appeal in the dis-
trict court. FED. R. APP. P. 4.
263. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1212 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). If the defen-
dant fled after filing a notice of appeal, the court of appeals could have dismissed
his appeal with prejudice. Id.; see Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970)
(per curiam) (stating courts may dismiss, with prejudice, the appeal of a defendant
who flees after filing a notice of appeal).
264. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1212 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In EsteUe the
court acknowledged encouragement of voluntary surrenders as a justification for the
Fugitive Dismissal Rule. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
265. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1212 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
266. Id. This was the second major justification for the Fugitive Dismissal Rule set
forth in Estele, 420 U.S. at 537.
267. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1212 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). As support
for this assertion, the dissent professed that the majority could not possibly be sug-
gesting that when a defendant absconds prior to invoking the appellate process, he
means only to disrespect the district court and not the appellate court. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. The dissent agreed with the portion of the majority's opinion that required
a connection between the appellate process and the defendant's fugitive status. Id.
270. Id. at 1209 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). This differs from the dissent's perspec-
tive in that the majority requires a "significant" interference. Id. The dissent's version
of the rule is far less restrictive in its use. Id.
271. Id. at 1208-10; see supra notes 190-98 and accompanying text for a more de-
tailed discussion of the Fugitive Dismissal Rule in these circumstances.
272. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1212 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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dissent stated that a connection between the fugitive's status and the
appellate process is indeed necessary, but that status as a former fugi-
tive has that requisite connection.' The defendant's flight in this case
delayed the appellate process for approximately nineteen months, caus-
ing adverse effects on the system. 4 Therefore, the dissent maintained
that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeal had the authority to dismiss
the defendant's appeal. 6
V. IMPACT
A. General Impact
The Fugitive Dismissal Rule, which began to evolve as early as the
nineteenth century in Smith v. United States,'7 has continued to de-
velop, and was extended in United States v. Holmes to include pre-
appeal fugitives.'m Following Holmes, the cases leading up to Ortega-
Rodriguez have expanded the scope of the rule even further. The Court
in Ortega-Rodriguez, however, put a stop to this development, taking a
step backwards by limiting the rule to those defendants who flee during
the pendency of their appeal.' This narrow holding will have a sub-
stantial impact in many different areas.
1. Economic Impact
First, the decision in Ortega-Rodriguez will have an impact economi-
cally. This rule tends to promote pre-appeal escapes. The greater the
number of defendants who flee, the greater the costs to the courts, the
taxpayers, and the government. The delay in the judicial process alone
will cost an unconscionable amount of money. 9 Also, severance of
273. Id.
274. Id. at 1212-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In the instant case, Ortega-
Rodriguez's escape not only caused a delay in the proceedings, but it also forced the
severance of his appeal from that of his co-defendants. See United States v. Mieres-
Borges, 919 F.2d 652, 663 (11th Cir. 1990) (affirming the conviction of Mieres-Borges
and overturning the conviction of Beccera-Flores), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 980 (1991).
275. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113. S. Ct. at 1212-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
276. 94 U.S. 97 (1876).
277. 680 F.2d 1372 (lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015 (1983), overruled by
Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. 1199 (1993).
278. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1209-10 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
279. Inflation has caused the costs and delays incident to appellate proceedings to
grow monumentally. See Alvin B. Rubin & Gilbert Ganucheau, Appellate Delay and
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appeals may occur under the proposed rule,' adding the enormous
costs of having separate appellate hearings for co-defendants convicted
in the same trial. In addition, under the Ortega-Rodriguez holding,
many retrials that never would have occurred under a different rule,
will have to be scheduled. The cost of these retrials must be borne by
the taxpayers.28'
2. Judicial Impact
The judicial system is the second area that will be substantially im-
pacted by the decision in Ortega-Rodriguez. The Court's holding will
sacrifice the efficient operation of all levels of the judicial system.'
This loss of efficiency will be experienced most prominently at the
appellate level. Under this rule, fugitives who are recaptured and
resentenced have the opportunity to file a timely appeal.' This will
force the appellate court to calendar cases that did not originally ap-
pear on the docket. 4 Adding these cases to the docket will serve to
further clog and hinder an already overburdened system.2'
Cost-An Ancient and Common Disease: Is It Intractable?, 42 MD. L REV. 752, 752
(1983).
280. See, e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1209 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
(stating that "petitioner's flight prevented the Court of Appeals from consolidating his
appeal with those of his codefendants, which we assume would be its normal prac-
tice").
281. It costs approximately $2186 to run a court room for a single day. Margot
Garey, Comment, The Cost of Taking a Life: Dollars and Sense of the.Death Penalty,
18 U.C. DAVIS L REV. 1221, 1255 (1985) (citing JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 1984
ANNUAL REPORT, at 53 (1984)). One example of the enormous cost of appeals is the
appeal of a death penalty conviction. In California, for example, each appeal costs
roughly $48,000-$60,000. Id. at 1263.
282. As a result of the strain on this nation's courts, the justice system and the
American public have suffered palpable harm. See RICHARDSON LYNN, DELAY ON AP-
PEAL 1 (1993).
283. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1209-10 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (hold-
ing that recaptured fugitives retain the right to file a timely appeal).
284. Id. at 1211 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting that "[t]his disruption to the
management of the court's docketing procedures is qualitatively different from delay
caused by other factors like settlement by the parties").
285. The number of appeals filed in the 12 regional appellate courts rose in 1989,
to an astounding 40,266. L Ralph Mecham Annual Report of the Administrative Of-
fice of the United States Courts, REP. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., Mar. 13, 1990
and Sept. 12, 1990, at 4. This 3% increase in the number of filings represented a
record high for appellate filings. Id. The number of appeals filed in United States
appellate courts continued to rise and totaled 44,465 in 1991. United States Courts
for the Ninth Circuit, ANN. REP. 70 (1992). Only a year later the number reached an
astronomical 47,756. Id. This signified a jump of 7.4% over the course of one year. It
has been estimated that every decade the enormous caseload of the appellate courts
in America doubles. See LYNN, supra note 282, at 6 n.3 (citing Marvell & Moody, The
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Another area of the judicial system adversely affected by the holding
in Ortega-Rodriguez is the dignity of the courts. Promoting the digni-
fied operation of the judicial system is a major concern of the Court.'
This holding not only fails to advance such an interest, it actually dam-
ages it. Logic foretells that as more defendants recognize that a pre-ap-
peal escape will not harm their chance to appeal, the greater the num-
ber of pre-appeal escape attempts that will occur. The dignified reputa-
tion of the judicial system, that society demands, will no longer exist; in
fact, the system will foster more disrespect than it had prior to Ortega-
Rodriguez. 7
3. Impact on Number of Escapes
The holding in Ortega-Rodriguez will also have a significant impact
on the number of attempted escapes. Under this holding, defendants
are put on notice that they will be able to obtain a second opportunity
to engage the appellate process if they escape prior to filing for appeal.
If recaptured, the defendants must simply convince the judge to resen-
tence them and they will have the opportunity to file a timely
appeal.' Even if the judge refuses to resentence the fugitive, the fugi-
tive is in no worse a position than he would have been had he escaped
after filing for an appeal.' This is because fugitives who flee after fil-
Effectiveness of Measures to Increase Appellate Court Efficiency and Decision Out-
put, 21 U. MICH. J.L REF. 415 n.1 (1988)). The average length of time between the
filing in the lower court and the final disposition in United States appellate court is
24 months. United States Courts for the Ninth Circuit, ANN. REP. 73 (1992). The av-
erage length of time between filing the notice of appeal and final disposition is 10.6
months. Id. Considering that every trial takes approximately 2 years to complete, and
every appeal nearly 11 months, allowing former fugitives to file for appeal following
recapture will result in an enormous loss of efficiency in the appellate courts. Id.
286. See United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1373 (lth Cir. 1982) (per curiam)
(promoting the dignified operation of appellate courts), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1015
(1983).
287. Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1199 (holding that recaptured fugitives retain
the right to a timely appeal). The felony escapes which occurred in the cases leading
up to this decision illustrate the disrespect experienced by the courts prior to the
Court's decision. See supra notes 23-97 and accompanying text.
288. See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text. The court is likely to resen-
tence the fugitive after recapture in order to include the sanction for his escape. See,
e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1203.
289. If the judge refuses to resentence the former fugitive, and the fugitive has
been at large for more than 10 days, his appeal would be barred by applicable time
limits. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provide the relevant time constraints
ing for an appeal would automatically have their appeal dismissed un-
der the pre-existing dismissal rule.' The Court's holding fails to deter
escapes, as intended by the Fugitive Dismissal Rule, and serves to pro-
mote pre-appeal escapes, a policy the Court could never have intended
to promote.
4. Social Impact
The decision in Ortega-Rodriguez will have a significant effect on
society. Individuals in modern society are already disenchanted with the
legal system" and many Americans believe that the judicial system
offers the criminal defendant too many benefits. The decision in
Ortega-Rodriguez places fewer restrictions on defendants who escape
prior to filing an appeal and then seek to petition their conviction fol-
lowing recapture. Hence, the former fugitive is given a second bite at
the proverbial appellate apple. Many in society already believe that
criminal defendants receive too many bites and are beginning to believe
that the apple, our judicial system, is rotten to the core.
Clearly, the holding in Ortega-Rodriguez, which prohibits appellate
courts from dismissing appeals of fugitives who escape prior to filing
for appeal, has far-reaching negative impacts. Perhaps the Court in
Ortega-Rodriguez could have offered a better rule to serve the interests
of the Court. The following section recommends such a rule.
B. Recommended Approach
A more preferable rule would be the "Discretionary Dismissal Rule
for Fugitives." The Court should weigh the following three factors in
making its determination of whether the former fugitive's appeal should
for filing a timely appeal. Rule 4 provides in pertinent part: "In a criminal case, a
defendant shall file the notice of appeal in the district court within 10 days after the
entry of either the judgment or order appealed from, or of a notice of appeal by the
Government." FED. R. APP. P. 4(b).
290. For the pre-existing Dismissal Rule, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.
291. See Richard Lacayo, Lock 'em up!, IME, Feb. 7, 1994, at 50. As of January
1994, crime was the number one concern of citizens of the United States. Id. at 52.
Anxiety concerning the high level of crime in the country ranks ahead of such prob-
lems as the economy, unemployment, and the budget deficit. Id.
292. See id.
293. Our society is preoccupied with crime. Id. at 51. One example of the frustra-
tion being felt by citizens throughout the nation is found in a letter written to a
judge in Dade County, Florida. Id. Concerning the chances afforded criminals, one
individual wrote, "Illine them up against the wall and get a firing squad and pull,
pull, pull. I am volunteering to pull, pull, pull." Id.
294. This three-factor rule is proposed by the author and is not yet widely accept-
ed.
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be dismissed: (1) length and effect of the delay; (2) voluntary versus
involuntary return; and (3) nature of the claim asserted.29 This rule
would grant appellate courts the unconditional authority to dismiss the
appeal of any fugitive or former fugitive. Moreover, there is a sufficient
connection to the appellate process to warrant the "Discretionary Dis-
missal Rule for Fugitives." ' Although this rule would grant a court
the authority to dismiss the appeal, it is recommended that a court do
so only after conducting a case-by-case analysis based upon the three
enumerated factors.2 ' These three factors make up the "Discretionary
Dismissal Rule for Fugitives."
1. Length and Effect of Fugitivity
The length and effect of fugitivity has two prongs:
a. Length of fugitivity
The first prong the court should consider in deciding whether or not
to dismiss an appeal is the length of fugitivity. The longer the period of
fugitivity, the greater the chance that the defendant's appeal would be
dismissed.298 Discouraging prolonged periods of fugitivity best serves
public policy. Every minute, hour, or day a fugitive is on the run means
a minute, hour, or day the authorities expend society's tax dollars to
295. See infra notes 296-310 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion and
analysis of the "Discretionary Dismissal Rule for Fugitives."
296. See Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1210-12 (1993)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating there is a sufficient connection to the appellate
process to warrant the dismissal of former fugitives' appeals).
297. See Perko v. Bowers, 945 F.2d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 1991) (stating the "court
should exercise its discretion in determining whether to dismiss a criminal
defendant's civil case based upon the circumstances of each individual case"), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1482 (1992); see, e.g., United States v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928, 930
(4th Cir. 1984) (illustrating the court "decided to exercise its discretion in favor of
permitting the appeal to proceed").
298. In Ortega-Rodriguez, the defendant eluded the authorities for 11 months. 113 S.
Ct. at 1202; see also United States v. Sudthisa-Ard, 17 F.3d 1205, 1206 (9th Cir. 1994)
(dismissing the appeal of a defendant who evaded law enforcement officials for 13
years); United States v. Bravo, 10 F.3d 79, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1993) (dismissing the appeal
of a defendant who remained a fugitive for 15 years) cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1386
(1994); United States v. Parrish, 887 F.2d 1107, 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (dismissing the
appeal of a defendant who remained at large for 14 years). But see Perko v. Bowers,
945 F.2d 1038, 1040 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding an inmate's escape for less than three
days did not warrant dismissal of his appeal), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct 1482 (1992).
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find him. Thus, the longer the period of fugitivity, the more apt the
court should be to dismiss the fugitive's appeal. This component of the
first factor is easily determined, and, as such, should be treated objec-
tively.' It is important to recognize that the length of fugitivity should
be viewed in light of its adverse effects on the judicial system, and
most importantly, on the appellate process. Furthermore, the court
should consider the fact that the adverse effects on the judicial system
will not always be proportionate to the length of the delay.
b. Effect of delay
The effect of delay caused by the defendant's flight is the second
prong of this first factor and also merits examination. This has been
proposed as the greatest justification for the Fugitive Dismissal
Rule.-' As such, the court should weigh this factor heavily in its deci-
sion as to whether to dismiss the appeal of a former fugitive. The effect
of the delay is intimately related to the length of fugitivity. The court
should focus on the ramifications to the appellate process that directly
result from the defendant's choice to flee.
For example, in a multi-defendant trial, the delay may force the sever-
ance of the defendant's appeal from that of his co-defendants."1 This
severance will result in the appellate court duplicating appeals, which is
both costly and inefficient.'m Again, public policy dictates that such in-
efficient use of judicial resources be avoided. An additional effect
caused by the length of the delay is the possibility of prejudicing the
government in locating witnesses and presenting evidence." During
the defendant's absence, witnesses become unavailable due to death, ill-
299. For example, in Ortega-Rodriguez, the defendant remained a fugitive for 11
months. 113 S. Ct. at 1202.
300. Gripando, supra note 40, at 694-95.
301. See, e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1203 (illustrating that a defendant's
escape may force the severance of his appeal from that of his codefendants'); United
States v. London, 723 F.2d 1538, 1539 (11th Cir.) (severing the defendant's appeal
from that of his six co-defendants), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984).
302. See supra notes 279-81 and accompanying text.
303. See United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he delay
occasioned by the period of a defendant's flight can prejudice the prosecution should
a new trial be ordered after a successful appeal."); United States v. Baccollo, 725
F.2d 170, 172 (2d Cir. 1983) ("IT]he two year deliberate flight and absence of defen-
dant . . . would gravely prejudice the government were the defendant successful on
his appeal .... During the lost two years witnesses, through death or other cause,
and other evidence may have become unavailable to the government.") (emphasis
deleted); United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372, 1374 (lth Cir. 1982) (per curiam),
overruled by, Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S.Ct. 1199, 1207 (1993). ("In the case of reversal,
the government would obviously be prejudiced in locating witnesses and retrying the
case.").
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ness, relocation or refusal to retestify.' Similarly, evidence that would
be used at the defendant's retrial becomes stale, lost, or otherwise
unavailable to the government. Public policy, therefore cries out that
such judicial inefficiencies be assessed against the former fugitive.
2. Voluntary Versus Involuntary Return
Another factor that should be considered in this balancing approach
is whether the defendant returned voluntarily or was recaptured invol-
untarily. Although the conditions under which the defendant returns
have no effect on the delay caused by flight, adding this factor to the
test is a matter of public policy." One of the goals of the Fugitive Dis-
missal Rule is to deter future escape attempts by convicted defendants.
Similarly, the rule should encourage, or at least not discourage, the
voluntary surrender of fugitives." Based on this public policy argu-
ment, the defendant's voluntary return should act in the defendant's
favor in determining whether to grant an appeal.'
3. Nature of the Claim
The final factor that should be considered in this balancing test is the
nature of the claim asserted. If, for example, the claim is based on a
constitutional issue, the court should favor entertaining the appeal of
the former fugitive.' Additionally, the court should hear the defen-
304. See BaccoUo, 725 F.2d at 172; Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1374 (elaborating on the
potential costs to the parties arising from delay).
305. See Gonzales v. Stover, 575 F.2d 827, 827-28 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
("For over one hundred years the Supreme Court has consistently refused to grant
post-conviction review for escaped prisoners. These decisions make it clear that the
Court's informal policy is grounded on considerations which favor voluntary surrender
and discourage escape.").
306. See Estelle v. Dorrough, 420 U.S. 534, 541 (1975) (per curiam) (stating that the
goal of discouraging felony escapes and encouraging voluntary surrender is a valid
justification for dismissing a defendant's appeal); see also Bonahan v. Nebraska, 125
U.S. 692, 692 (1887) (indicating that the defendant's surrender would prevent the dis-
missal of his appeal). But see United States v. Snow, 748 F.2d 928, 930 (4th Cir.
1984) (stating the fact that the defendant "did not voluntarily surrender" and was
.recaptured against his will ... militates against granting [appellant] a judicial forum
where he can contest the terms and conditions of his sentence").
307. See Grippando, supra note 40 at 692.
308. See United States v. Veliotis, 586 F. Supp. 1512, 1514 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[W]here
a fugitive defendant seeks to vindicate a right vouchsafed by the United States Con-
stitution, the Court should give weight to this factor in determining how to exercise
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dant's appeal when the defendant seeks acquittal rather than retrial."
In contrast, if the claim asserted results in a re-trial, following a long
delay, the government may be unable to reproduce evidence or relocate
witnesses."' In such cases, the court should endorse dismissal of the
defendant's appeal.
Based on the length and effect of fugitivity, voluntary versus involun-
tary return, and nature of the claim, which together comprise the "Dis-
cretionary Dismissal Rule for Fugitives," courts will be able to deter-
mine whether the appeal of a former fugitive warrants dismissal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal courts' authority to dismiss the appeal of a fugitive who
escapes after filing for a timely appeal is well established."' Recently,
lower courts have extended this power to include the ability to dismiss
the appeal of a defendant who flees prior to filing for appeal, but is
later recaptured and files a timely appeal."2 The Court's most recent
holding on this issue in Ortega-Rodriguez retreated from this develop-
ment and limited the appellate courts' authority to dismiss the appeal of
a former fugitive."3 This holding is inconsistent with the evolution of
the law in this area. "
its discretion."); see also United States v. Tunnell, 650 F.2d 1124, 1126 (9th Cir. 1981)
(stating the fact that the defendant remained at large for 12 years before being re-
captured did not justify dismissal of their appeal where convictions may have been
based on an unconstitutional presumption); United States v. Tapia-Lopez, 521 F.2d
582, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam) (reversing the conviction of the defendant
where an unconstitutional jury instruction was given, despite the fact that the defen-
dant escaped after conviction and was not sentenced until after she reappeared 5
years later).
309. If the court determines that there was insufficient evidence to support the
defendant's conviction, the decision will be reversed and no retrial will occur. See,
e.g., Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 (1993). Thus, the govern-
ment will not be prejudiced by its inability to locate witnesses or present evidence.
Id.
310. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
312. See London v. United States, 723 F.2d 1538, 1539 (lth Cir.) (holding that the
appeal of defendants who flee and are recaptured prior to filing an appeal may be
dismissed), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228 (1984); United States v. Holmes, 680 F.2d 1372
(l1th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (stating that appellate courts may dismiss the appeal of
a former fugitive who subsequently files an appeal of his conviction), cert. denied,
460 U.S. 1015 (1983).
313. See Ortega-Rodriguez, 113 S. Ct. at 1209 (1993) (holding that a defendant's es-
cape and recapture prior to filing a notice of appeal lacks the requisite connection to
the appellate process to warrant dismissal).
314. See London, 723 F.2d at 1538 (extending the Fugitive Dismissal Rule to include
former fugitives); Holmes, 680 F.2d at 1372 (expanding the existing law to grant ap-
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A better approach to this issue would be to grant the appellate court
the unconditional right to dismiss the appeal of a former fugitive under
the authority of the "Discretionary Dismissal Rule for Fugitives," or
other similar rule."' This decision, however, should be based on a
case-by-case analysis consisting of a delicate three-part balancing test
weighing the following factors: the length and effect of fugitivity, volun-
tary versus involuntary return, and the nature of the claim asserted on
appeal. This approach would allow the courts to ensure the dignified,
efficient operation of the court system while at the same time deterring
future escapes.
ANTHONY MICHAEL ALTMAN
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pellate courts the authority to dismiss the appeal of former fugitives).
315. See discussion supr part V(B).

